


Jepson



wheels within wheels

Kyle Kingsbury  
@aphyr  
He/him

I Break  
Databases!



Public  
API {




} API code

Ruby {



} DBs








Databases!

Queues!


Discovery!


THE HORROR



# Broken

# Foreign Keys






Anomalies

How do you  
know if a  
system is safe?




Measure  
your  
Systems




Jepsen

<https://jepsen.io>


# Environment





- INVARIANTS -






client:  $w - w'$     $r - r'$     $w - w'$

DB:

client:  $w - w'$     $w - \dots$



Clients Generate  
random operations  $(w)$   
and apply them  
to the system  $(w')$

A diagram illustrating a process flow. The text is arranged in four lines. The first line is 'Clients Generate'. The second line is 'random operations (w)', where '(w)' is in purple. The third line is 'and apply them'. The fourth line is 'to the system (w')', where '(w\'' is in purple. A large purple arrow points downwards from the '(w)' in the second line to the '(w\'' in the fourth line.

invoke  ok

invoke fail

involve ? ? info ? ? ?

invoke ok

inveke fail

invoke ok


invoke info

invoke ok


invoke fail

invoke ok

invoke info



# Elle: Find Cycles



$$T_1 \rightarrow T_2$$

---

$$ww : w(v_1) \rightarrow w(v_2)$$

$$wr : w(v_1) \rightarrow r(v_1)$$

$$rw : r(v_1) \rightarrow w(v_2)$$

$$v_1 \ll v_2$$

read(x)  $\Rightarrow$  5

read(x)  $\Rightarrow$  3

3 << 5      |      5 << 3

Either could be true!



append(x, 3)

$[1, 2] \rightarrow [1, 2, 3]$

$[4, 7] \rightarrow [4, 7, 3]$

$[] \rightarrow [3]$

append(x, 3)

[1, 2]

→

[1, 2, 3]

[4, 7]

→


[4, 7, 3]

[]

→

[3]

append(x, 3)



[1, 4, 3]




$$v_3 = [1, 4, 3]$$


$$v_2 = [1, 4]$$


$$v_1 = [1]$$

$$v_0 = []$$

$T_1: a(x, 1), a(x, 3)$



$T_2: a(x, 2), r(x, [1, 2])$



- Write Cycle
- Aborted Read
- Intermediate Read
- Cyclic Information Flow
- Read Skew
- Anti-dependency Cycle



- Garbage Reads
- Incompatible Versions
- Internal Consistency Violations
- Duplicate Writes

$$O(n!)$$

~~$O(n!)$~~


$O(n)$


1. Generate ops

2. Record history

3. Verify history is  
consistent w/model

# Network Partitions






POST  
GRE  
SQL

12.3


Single-node

SQL database

Claimed







Okay, let's  
try it!



$r(y, [1, 2]), r(x, [4, 5]), a(x, 8)$

$\downarrow$  rw  
 $a(y, 4), a(y, 5)$

wr  $\downarrow$   
 $r(y, [1, 2, 4, 5]), r(x, [4, 5])$

$\uparrow$  rw

G2-Item

Illegal under RR

Legal under SI

But PG claims "RR"  
is stronger  
than SQL  
standard RR!



SQL standard is

ambiguous


(Bercson & Adya argue  
the spec is bad)

OK how about


SERIALIZABLE?



SI, but also prevent  
"Dangerous Structures"



(a) Example 1: Simple Write Skew



(b) Example 2: Batch Processing

$a(y, 2), r(x, [])$

rw ↑

↓ rw

$r(y, []), a(x, 4), \dots$

G2-Item

$a(y, 3), r(x, [])$

$a(x, 3), r(x, [3])$

$r(x, [3]), r(y, [])$



(Also G2-Item)

$a(y, 2), r(x, [])$

$rw \uparrow$

$\downarrow rw$

$r(y, []), a(x, 4), \dots$



(a) Example 1: Simple Write Skew



$a(y, 3), r(x, [])$

$rw \uparrow$

$\downarrow rw$

$a(x, 3), r(x, [3])$

$r(x, [3]), r(y, [])$



(b) Example 2: Batch Processing

"Serializable"

Strict ISR

Claimed  
vs  
Actual

~~Serializable SI~~

~~Serializable~~

~~Repeatable  
Read~~

Read Committed

Read Uncommitted

Strong SI

"Serializable"

Snapshot  
Isolation

Conflict detection mechanism  
incorrectly tagged one txn  
as writer of both old &  
new versions

→ Txn could commit failing to  
observe another's writes!

- 9.5.22 → 9.5.23

- 10.13 → 10.14

- 11.8 → 11.9

- 12.3 → 12.4

- 13(dev) → 13.0

"Serializable"

Best guess

Strict ISR

Serializable SI

"Repeatable Read"

Strong SI

Serializable

Repeatable  
Read


Snapshot  
Isolation

Read Committed

"Read Committed"  
"Read Uncommitted"

Read Uncommitted





Mongo DB

4.2.6

"...Among the strongest data  
Consistency, Correctness, and  
Safety guarantees of any  
database available today"

"Full ACID  
transactions"

"ACID"

Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable

Read

Cursor

Stability

Read

Read

Committed

Uncommitted

Snapshot

Isolation

Monotonic

Atomic

View

"Stronger"

"Weaker"

"ACID"



Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable

Read

Cursor

Stability

Read

Read

Committed

Uncommitted

Snapshot  
Isolation

Monotonic


Atomic

View

Mongo  
(Claimed)

# Assumes:

- Majority Writers
- Snapshot Reads



# Defaults:

- "Committed" writes may be thrown away silently
- Reads "whatever a single node has locally"

"ACID"

Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable

Read

Cursor

Stability

Read

Committed

Read

Uncommitted

Snapshot

Isolation

Monotonic

Atomic

View

??

Defaults



GO: Write Cycle


$T_1: w(x_1) \quad w(y_2)$

$T_2: w(x_2) \quad w(y_1)$

Requires a total order  
over committed versions

$$x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow x_3 \rightarrow \dots$$

Mango Allaws Split-Brain!



$X_3 \ll X_5 ???$

"ACID"

Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable

Read

Cursor

Stability

Read

Read

Committed

Uncommitted

Snapshot

Isolation

Monotonic

Atomic

View

Mongo DB defaults?

call = db.with Read Concern (LINEARIZABLE)  
          .with Write Concern (MAJORITY)...

call.updateOne(..., newVersion)

→ SI / Linearizable

single-doc ops

call = db.with Read Concern (LINEARIZABLE)  
          .with Write Concern (MAJORITY)...

session = conn.startSession()

session.withTransaction(...

[call.updateOne(session..., newVersion)])

→ Last Writer

Aborted Reads

Transactions silently

downgrade read concern

to LOCAL, by ignoring

DB \$ Collection-level

read concern.

Transaction Options. Builder().

.readConcern (SNAPSHOT)

→ Split-Brain

Aborted reads

Definitely not Snapshot Isal.



Read Concern      SNAPSHOT

isn't actually a snapshot

read unless you also

Use Write Concern      MAJORITY

Even for read-only txns!?

$r(x, [])$

$r(x, [1, 5])$

$r(x, [1, 5, 6])$

$r(x, [])$  *uhhh...*

$r(x, [3])$

$r(x, [3, 7])$

*So are we*

*just pretending*

*1, 5, 6 never happened?*

TransactionOptions.Builder().

.readConcern(SNAPSHOT)

.writeConcern(MAJORITY)

This is all in the docs!

It's just surprising!

# Hasted MangaDB Users

20%. Default Write Concern

99.6%. Default Read Concern

(VLDB '19)

Mango's own example used  
read concern LOCAL w/ write-  
only txns, or used only  
defaults.

Most third party blog

parts claimed SI/"ACIP"

but inadvertently or intentionally

allowed write law & started reads

How

ACID

is

— Snapshot Isolation —

anyway?

$T_1: \text{append}(x, 1), \text{read}(y, [])$



$T_2: \text{append}(y, 1), \text{read}(x, [])$

G2-item (write skew)



Legal under SI...

Definitely **not** isolated!

"FVH ACID"

123 txns all depending on each other

~10% of txns violated

isolation in healthy Mango

clusters.

- Does this matter?? Maybe...

Are MAJORITY/SHOT

txns even Snapshot Isolated,

though?

$T_1: \text{append}(x, 6), \dots$

$T_2: r(x, [2, 4, 1, 6, 8, 7, 6]).$

$\dots$

Maybe an improper txn  
retry?



Txns **ignore** the

retryWrites setting \$

retry regardless...

$a(y, 4), r(x, [1, 2, 3])$



$r(x, [1, 2]), a(y, 5)$



$\dots, a(x, 3), \dots$





G-Single

Read Skew

$r(x, [1, 3, 5]), a(y, 3)$

$r(y, [2, 3]), a(x, 5)$



G1C

---


Cyclic Information

Flow

wr???

$r(x, [1, 2, 3, 4]), \dots, a(x, 1)$





INT

Internal Consistency

Violations

"ACID"

Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable  
Read

Snapshot  
Isolation

Mongo  
(Claimed strongest)

Cursor  
Stability

Monotonic  
Atomic  
View

~~Read Committed~~

~~Read Uncommitted~~

' >>>  
' ...

Mongo  
(Actual strongest)

# SERVER 48307

Committed txns could

incorrectly appear to

fail — fixed in 4.2.8



"ACID"



Strict ISR

Serializable

Repeatable  
Read

Snapshot  
Isolation

Mongo  
(Actual strongest)

Cursor  
Stability

Monotonic  
Atomic

View

Read Committed

Read Uncommitted

???

Mongo  
(Default)



# redis

redis raft 1b3fbf6

New replication system  
for Redis, based on  
Raft!

(Unreleased internal builds)

Strict 1SR

Serializable

Repeatable

Read

Cursor

Stability

Read

Read

Committed

Uncommitted

Snapshot  
Isolation

Monotonic

Atomic

View

#13

INFINITE  
DOES

A circular diagram with the words "INFINITE" and "DOES" arranged in a circle. The word "INFINITE" is at the top, and "DOES" is at the bottom. Two curved arrows connect them: one on the left pointing from "DOES" up to "INFINITE", and one on the right pointing from "INFINITE" down to "DOES".

follower

leader

SET

RAFT SET

BROADCAST

ACK

COMMITTED

"ak, apply SET"

RAFT SET


:

Fixed in 0589127

via re-entrancy check

#14


Total Data Loss on  
Any failover





follower

leader




Fixed in d589127

as well


# 17

Split - Brain



Last Updates

# Joint Consensus



Old Cohort


New Cohort

(L)

(L)

(f)

"forget about  
there two...  
you don't need  
their approval!"



RAFT\_LOGTYPE\_REMOVE\_NODE left

out of set of msg types considered


Voting config changes

Partial fix in 8da0c77, rest in #28

#18

Transient Stale Reads





time →

$[1, 2]$

$[1, 2, 3]$

$[1, 2]$  ???



RPUSH 3

Raft library failed to issue no-op


log entries on coming to power —

failed to establish commit point

Fixed in dfd91d4


(already addressed upstream)

#21



Spurious  
NOLEAPER in  
Healthy Clusters

hundreds of seconds



... OK OK OK NOLEADER NOLEADER OK ...



time

- Connection handling issues caused long stalls after re-election
- Aggressive default timeouts led to frequent elections

Fixed in  
recent builds



#23

Aborted Reads

with

NOLLEADER

RPUSH 3


NOLEADER

LRANGE

[2, 3, 4]

Addressed by a suite of  
protocol-level fixes in @657423

#25



DISCARD

Doesn't Always

Discard

```
try {  
    conn.multi()  
    conn.set(x, 2)  
    conn.rpush(y, 3)  
    conn.exec()  
} catch (Exception e {  
    conn.discard()  
}
```

```
try {
```

```
    conn.multi()
```

```
    conn.set(x, 2)
```

```
    conn.rpush(y, 3)
```

```
    conn.exec()
```

→ saved for later!

```
} catch (Exception e {
```

```
    conn.discard()
```

```
}
```

Conn.multi()  
Conn.get(x)  
Conn.exec()



Conn.set(x, 2)  
Conn.rpush(y, 3)  
Conn.get(x)

DISCARD went through Raft log

- Could fail!


- Leaving Conn in MULTI state

- Fixed in f46649f

- Now a local state machine



#26



Network partitions + crashes caused  
Redis-Raft to send responses to wrong  
clients

⇒ Type errors

⇒ Silent data corruption

- Replies for proxied commands used Redis-RAFT ctx, not request ctx
- Leaders re-bundled MULTI txns
- Error handling around async context cleanups

Fixed by e657423



# 28

More Split-Brain

&

Last Updates

Membership changer w/ crasher could create  
weird split-brain states



## Bug in Raft Library!

- Nodes were supposed to be demoted  
THEN removed
- Node left running, w/ data files, after  
removal

Fixed in bc 9552f



#30

Mare Transient

Empty Reads

Nodes which restart after membership  
change temporarily exhibited empty reads

Very rare!


## Bugs in log loading process

1. Used all nodes, not voting nodes, to determine log entry committed state
2. Could treat former cluster members as if they were active nodes!

Fixed in 73ad 833

Even More

Split Brain



Due to a bug in the  
Snapshot loading process —  
file in memory, but next  
snapshot would be missing nodes!

Fixed in 2d1cf30



#52

Dueling

Histories

$[1, 2]$

$[1, 2, 3]$

$[1, 3, 4]$

$[1, 2]$

$[1, 2, 3]$

$[1, 2, 2, 3]$

Happens when we

Kill processes

fixed in

e0123 a9




- Mix of segfaults & asserts
- Some point to Raft invariant violations
- Most not associated w/ observable safety issues

All fixed!

# Strict ISR

Redis  
Goal



Redis Actual




All of these were in  
early dev builds

→ No users to affect!

Strict ISR?

Redis  
Goal



Recap



Read the docs!



Then test it

— for —

YOURSELF

"Strict"

"ACID"

"Strong"





Be Formal

&

Be Specific.!

Figure out the  
Invariants  
your system needs



USE

Proven

algorithms

PROOFS

*aren't*

ENOUGH

Consider  
your  
failure modes

# Process Crash

#kill -9 1234

# Node failure

- AWS terminate
- Physical power switch

# Clock Skew

# date 10280000

# fake time ...

# GC/IO Pause

# killall -s STOP foo

# killall -s CONT foo

# Network Partition

# iptables -j DROP

# tc qdisc ... delay...

drop...



- Property testing
- High-level invariants
- With distsys failure modes

If you look for

✦ perfection ✦

you will never be  
content

# Thanks

- Peter Alvaro
- Kit Patella
- Andres Freund
- Peter Geoghegan
- Félix Gerzagnet

# Thanks

- Thomas Munroe
- Daniel Verite
- Maxime Bengnet
- Redis Labs \$
- Yiftach Shoolman

Thanks

-Yossi Gottlieb

<https://jepsen.io>